Outsourcing computing allows users with resource-constrained devices to outsource their complex computation workloads to cloud servers that may not be honest. In this paper, we propose a new algorithm for securing the outsourcing of composite modular exponentiation, which is one of the most complex computing tasks in discretelog based cryptographic protocols. Unlike algorithms based on two untrusted servers, we outsource modular exponentiation operation to only a single server, which eliminates the potential for a collusion attack when using two servers. Moreover, our proposed algorithm can hide the base and exponent of the outsourced data, which prevents the exposure of sensitive information to cloud servers. In addition, compared with the state-of-the-art algorithms, our scheme has remarkably better checkability. The user could detect any misbehavior with a probability of one if the server returns a fault result.
Introduction
Cloud computing is a service that enables convenient, on-demand network access to a shared pool of configurable computing resources that can be instantly deployed and released using minimal management effort [1] . With the rapid development of cloud computing, outsourcing computing has emerged as a new paradigm. This allows users with resource-constrained devices to outsource their complex computational tasks to cloud servers and enjoy unlimited computing resources in a convenient pay-per-use manner. During the whole process of outsourcing, clients do not need to buy any physical servers, storage, software, etc., and do not need to worry about the source of the service. They can directly use the desired services and applications through the network.
Although outsourcing computation provides great convenience for users, it inevitably creates some new security concerns and challenges [2] . First, outsourced computation tasks often contain sensitive information [3] such as personal medical records, personal income status and family member information, which should not be exposed to cloud servers. Therefore, protecting a user's sensitive input/output information is one of the biggest challenges that has arisen with the progress on outsourcing data [4] . Second, because cloud servers are not fully trusted [5] , they may return incorrect results. For example, outsourced calculations often require large quantities of computing resources. If users cannot determine whether the cloud server's outputs is correct, the cloud server may be "lazy" to save resources [6] . In addition, software bugs and malicious attacks from adversaries may affect the correctness of the calculation results [7] . As a result, efficiently verifying the outsourced computation results is another important security challenge that has arisen with the progress on outsourcing data. If the outsourcer can verify the results returned by the server with high probability, it is easy to detect any misbehavior of the server.
To address these two key issues, many studies have been performed to find ways securely outsource expensive computations. Chaum et al. [8] first introduced the concept of "wallets with observers", which allows users to install a piece of hardware on their computers to handle some expensive computing workloads. Atallah et al. [16] studied the secure outsourcing of numerical calculations and scientific computing for the first time, and proposed a few effective hiding techniques for scientific computations such as matrix multiplication, inequalities and linear equations. These hiding techniques can guarantee the security and privacy of users' data. Hohenberger et al. [9] first provided a formal security definition and a security model for outsourcing computations, and proposed a secure outsourcing algorithm for modular exponentiation based on two non-colluding cloud servers.
In this paper, we propose a new algorithm, called CExp for the secure outsourcing of composite modular exponentiation. Our main contributions are summarized as follows: 1) In contrast to algorithms based on two untrusted servers, we outsource the modular exponentiation operation to only a single server. As a result, it can eliminate the potential for a collusion attack that exists when using two servers. 2) Our proposed algorithm can hide the base and exponent of the outsourced data utilizing a new mathematical division operation. Therefore, our algorithm can realize complete input and output privacy. 3) In particular, compared with the state-of-the-art algorithms, our algorithm gets remarkably better in checkability. The outsourcer can detect any misbehavior with a probability of one. Thus it is not possible for the outsourcer to be cheated by the cloud server.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a review of the related work on secure outsourcing computation schemes. Section 3 introduces the security definition and system model. The proposed algorithm for modular exponentiation is presented in section 4. We provide a security analysis of the proposed algorithm in section 5. Section 6 evaluates the performance of CExp. Finally, this paper is concluded in section 7.
Related work
Atallah et al. [16] first studied the secure outsourcing of numerical calculations and scientific computing, and proposed some disguise techniques for scientific computations such as matrix multiplication, inequalities and linear equations. These disguise techniques can ensure the security and privacy of the user's data. However, they did not discuss the problem that the results cannot be verified. Benjamin et al. [17] used a semantically secure encryption scheme for expensive linear algebra computations (e.g. the multiplication of huge matrices) to construct a verifiable security outsourcing computing protocol for complicated calculations. Gentry et al. [18] first introduced and formalized the notion of verifiable computation, and many effectual studies can be found in this area [19] [20] [21] [22] . Moreover, Gentry et al. [18] proposed a fully-homorphic encryption scheme to achieve exceedingly efficient outsourcing, and this scheme can ensure the privacy of the client's inputs and outputs. Atallah et al. [23] proposed a protocol that outsources matrix multiplication based on the weak secret hiding assumption, but this protocol requires the client to perform homomorphic encryption. Subsequently, Wang et al. [24] utilized hiding techniques, iterative methods and semantically secure additive homomorphic encryption, and proposed efficient mechanisms for solving large-scale systems of linear equations in the cloud.
In the cryptographic community, various outsourcing modular exponentiation algorithms [8] - [15] have been designed. Chaum et al. [8] first introduced the notion of "wallets with observers", which allows users to install a piece of hardware on their computers to handle some expensive computing workloads. Hohenberger et al. [9] provided a formal security definition for outsourcing computations, and proposed a secure outsourcing algorithm for exponentiation modulo a prime based on two non-colluding cloud servers. Based on these protocols, Hohenberger et al. [9] achieved outsource-secure Cramer-Shoup encryptions and Schnorr signatures in the cloud environment. However, the checkability of the results with their scheme is only 1/2. Chen et al. [10] proposed a new secure outsourcing scheme for modular exponentiation based on two untrusted program models. Compared with the algorithm [9] , the proposed scheme is superior in both efficiency and checkability. Meanwhile, Chen et al. also proposed the first secure and efficient outsourcing algorithm for simultaneous modular exponentiations in [10] . Ye et al. [11] proposed a novel secure outsourcing algorithm for modular exponentiation based on a new mathematical division operation under two non-colluding cloud servers. The base and exponent of the outsourced data can be kept private and the user's computational burden is greatly reduced. Note that all the algorithms in [9] - [11] are based on two untrusted servers. Therefore, they may suffer from a collusion attack [10] . Dijk et al. [12] proposed the first outsourcing scheme for modular exponentiation with a single untrusted program. Unfortunately, because the base of the outsourced exponentiation is exposed to the untrusted server, their scheme cannot guarantee the privacy of the queried input. Ma et al. [13] proposed a new outsourcing scheme for multiple modular exponentiations based on a single untrusted server. Compared with the schemes in [9, 10] , it does not require complex pre-computation operations which makes it more efficient when solving multiple modular exponentiations. However, their scheme has obvious defects in relation to privacy and the bases and exponents of the outsourced data are public for the servers. Wang et al. [14] proposed a new outsourcing scheme for modular exponentiation with a single untrusted server. This scheme can guarantee the privacy of the exponent and base, but the checkability of the result is just 1/2. Recently, Ding et al. [15] proposed a new secure outsourcing scheme for modular exponentiations based on a single untrusted program model. The checkability of the algorithm in [15] is much better than that of the algorithm proposed in Ref. [14] .
Security definition and system model

Security definition
We say that a trusted entity T securely outsources some tasks to an untrusted program U, and (T,U) turns into an outsource-secure implementation of a cryptographic algorithm Alg if (1) T and U implement Alg together, i.e., Alg¼T U and (2) even if T provides oracle access to a ma-
that remembers all of its computations over time and tries to behave maliciously, U 0 cannot learn any useful information about the input or output of T U 0 . In the following, we introduce the security definition for the secure outsourcing algorithm [9] .
Definition 1. (Algorithm with outsource-I/O
). An algorithm Alg complies with the outsource input/output specification if it takes five inputs and generates three outputs. An honest party generates the first three inputs, which are classified by how much the adversary A ¼ (E,U 0 ) knows about them, where E is the adversarial environment that submits adversarial chosen inputs to Alg, and U 0 is the adversarial software operation that is used to replace oracle U. The first input is called the honest, secret input, which is unknown to both E and U 0 ; the second input is called the honest, protected input, which may be known to E, but is shielded from U 0 ; the third input is called the honest, unprotected input, which may be known to E and U. The other two inputs are generated by the environment E and include the adversarial, protected input , which is known by E, but shielded from U 0 , and the adversarial, unprotected input, which may be known to both E and U. Similarly, the first output is called the honest output, which is unknown to both E and U 0 ; the second is protected, which may be known by E, but not U 0 ; and the third is unprotected, which may be known by both parties of A.
The following definition of outsource-security guarantees that the malicious environment E cannot obtain any useful information of the secret inputs and outputs of T Here we only provide a brief summary of definition 2. For a complete introduction can refer to [9] . 
System model
In this paper, our model includes two entities, the user T and cloud server U. The user T has some complex computing tasks to calculate but lacks the computing power. The cloud server has significant computing power, but can only be assumed to be semi-trusted. When users want to compute modular exponentiations utilizing the cloud server, the process is as follows: The system model for this scenario is shown in Fig. 1 .
Proposed algorithm for modular exponentiation
We propose a new secure outsourcing algorithm CExp for exponentiation modulo a composite in the one-malicious model [9] . In CExp, T uses a subroutine called RandN [25] , which can speed up computations and reduce the computational overhead. A requirement for CExp is that an adversary cannot know any useful information about the inputs and outputs of CExp. In the following algorithm, U(x,y) → y x expresses that U takes (x,y) as the input and outputs y 
Division
Our main method is to logically split u and d into random looking pieces that can be easily computed by U. The first logical divisions are
where w ¼ u/g 1 and
Through the first logical divisions, the base u has been hidden, which is expressed based on random values for v 1 ,g 1 and w. Next, we also need to hide the exponent d. In order to achieve this goal, the second logical divisions are
where
The second logical divisions cause d to be blinded by random values l 1 ,k 1 and t 1 . In order to enhance the security of the inputs, the random blinding factor t 1 should be at least 64 bits long.
Meanwhile, T transforms (u 0 ) d using a similar approach,
Solve
Using these values (r 1 
If not, it indicates that U has produced wrong responses, and T outputs "error"; otherwise, T can compute the final result
Security evaluation
In this section, we provide a security analysis for the proposed algorithm CExp in the one-malicious model, along with a comparison of different algorithms. Proof: The correctness property is obvious. If U performs honestly, T can compute
Security analysis
Based on equations (8) and (9), equation (6) is established as long as U generates correct responses.
Next we prove the security. First, we prove Pair One EVIE-W real~E VIEW ideal : if the input (d,u) is not the case of an honest, secret input,E can always know the input information. Obviously, the execution process of the simulator S 1 will be the same as that of a real experiment in this case. Consequently, we only need to consider the case of an honest, secret input. In the ideal experiment, the execution process of the simulator S 1 is as follows: after receiving the input on round i, S 1 ignores it and instead makes six random queries of the form (α j ,β j ) to U is dishonest on round i and returns incorrect calculation results, then the error will be detected by both T and S 1 with a probability of one, resulting in an output of "error". Thus, EVIEW can always know the input information. Obviously, the execution process of the simulator S 2 will be the same as a real experiment in this case. Consequently, we only need to consider the case where the input is honest, secret; honest, protected; or adversarial, protected. In the ideal experimental environment, S 2 always behaves as follows: after getting the input on round i, S 2 ignores it and instead makes six random queries of the form (α j ,β j ) to U (6) is established.
If the equation does not hold, this indicates that U has produced wrong responses. T will detect the misbehavior of server U with a probability of one.
Comparison
We compare the proposed algorithm with the state-of-the-art algorithms [10] [14] . Let MM denote a modular multiplication, MInv denote a modular inverse, and Invoke denote an invocation of the subroutineRandN. We omit other operations such as modular additions in these algorithms because the computation of these operations is negligible compared to the others. A comparison of the efficiency and checkability of these algorithms is provided in Table 1 .
According to Table 1 , we can see that the checkability of CExp is much higher than those of Exp [10] , and GExp [14] . In CExp, the outsourcer can detect any misbehavior with a probability of one. Thus, it is not possible for the outsourcer to be cheated by the cloud server. Although Exp [10] performs better in terms of the benchmark MM, it is based on the two untrusted program models. Thus, Exp [10] may suffer from collusion attack. Compared with GExp [14] , our CExp needs to pay additional 1.5loga MM to calculate the value of r a . Note that when it comes to variable-based and fixed-exponent exponentiation case, we can reduce the computational overhead by amortization, since we can reuse the r a .
Performance evaluation
We implemented our proposed outsourcing algorithm using the Python language. Our experiment was conducted on two machines with Intel Core i5 processors running at 3.20 GHz with 4G of memory (cloud server), and an Intel Core i5 processor running at 2.10 GHz with 2G of memory (local user). Fig. 2 shows the time cost results of computing the modular exponentiation with the CExp algorithm and without the outsourcing algorithm. The time cost for CExp is smaller than that for computing modular exponentiation without outsourcing. By utilizing our proposed outsourcing algorithm, the time cost can be greatly reduced because CExp delegates some heavy calculations to U. In this way the user can afford the computational overhead, which is much less than before. In Fig. 3 , we provide the simulation results of the CExp algorithm, with the time costs of different exponent bit lengths. Computing the modular exponentiation without outsourcing is rather time-consuming. Note that the time cost of computing the modular exponentiation without an outsourcing algorithm increases relatively quickly as the bit length of the exponent grows. By utilizing our proposed outsourcing algorithm CExp, the time cost increases slowly with the bit length of the exponent. The time costs with different bit lengths for the base is shown in Fig. 4 . As the bit length of the base increases, the time cost of the modular exponentiation without outsourcing increases, but the time cost for CExp is almost constant.
Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed a new algorithm for the secure outsourcing of composite modular exponentiation with only one untrusted server, which avoids the risk of a collusion attack. In addition, the proposed algorithm can guarantee the privacy of the outsourced data. After logically splitting the data into random looking pieces, the cloud server cannot obtain any sensitive information. In particular, in our proposed algorithm, the outsourcer can detect any misbehavior of the server with a probability of one. In addition, the analysis and experimental results show that our proposed algorithm is provably secure and efficient.
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